There are many controversial theses about intrinsicness and duplication. The first aim of this paper is to introduce a puzzle that shows that two of the uncontroversial sounding ones can't both be true. The second aim is to suggest that the best way out of the puzzle requires sharpening some distinctions that are too frequently blurred, and adopting a fairly radical reconception of the ways things are.
The problem is that the arrangement of the two objects is different. So what we need is a principle that says that if all the perfectly natural properties are not emergent properties, and if the parts of x and y are duplicates, and those parts are arranged the same way, then x and y are duplicates.
Saying this formally is not exactly trivial. The following version uses the idea of an isometry 1 .
Parts Principle. This principle holds in all worlds in which no fundamental properties or quantities are emergent. If X and Y are sets of material objects, a is the fusion of the members of X and b is the fusion of the members of Y, f is a function X → Y, and i is an isometry defined on the space that X and Y are in, and the following conditions hold:
• For all x in X, f(x) is a duplicate of x; and 1 An isometry is "a transformation that does not change the distance between points" (Yaglom 1962: 11) . That is, it is a function from points to points that doesn't change distances. Although the isometry is initially defined as a function on points, it can obviously be extended to a function from regions to regions. If r is a region, i.e. a set of points, then f(r) is {f(x): x ∈ r}. The Parts Principle is not as easy to state as the Intrinsicness Principle, but I think the idea it is expressing is fairly intuitive. Nevertheless, I think the two principles cannot both be true.
Three Distinctions
The problem I'll be focussing on looks rather simple, but it brings out several points that seem to have metaphysical interest. In particular, it highlights the importance of three distinctions that are easy to blur when doing metaphysics. It will make the exposition of the puzzle easier to place these distinctions up front. 
The Asymmetric Magnets Problem
Our puzzle is similar to the spinning sphere, often thought to raise a problem for Humean Supervenience (Armstrong 1980). The similarity is not in respect of its target; the puzzle is meant to be a puzzle for everyone who accepts those two principles, not just the Humean. Rather, the similarity is in that the puzzle is set in a world where there are homogeneous physical objects.
Such a world is in many ways quite distant from actuality. But I think such worlds are useful fictions for elucidating the conceptual connections between central concepts in metaphysics. The puzzle is also set in a world with Euclidean spatial geometry. Again this is a fiction, but a useful one for working out conceptual connections. I've added the labels.
Each magnet has one sharp end and one flat end. Each also has one north pole and one south pole. And, of course, each has one end to the right (from the teachers' point of view) and one end to the left. The distribution of these properties of ends is different in the three cases.
• A's north pole is sharp and to the right.
• B's north pole is sharp and to the left.
• C's north pole is flat and to the left.
Question: Which of the magnets are duplicates?
Answer: A and B, but not C.
I hope you agree with the answer! If not, let me provide a small argument.
A and B are intrinsic duplicates because we could 'line up' A and B by picking A up, spinning it around, and moving it across a bit. And that's only possible if the two objects are duplicates. This idea, that objects that can be transformed into one another by simple geometric transformations such as rotation and translation is a very deep part of our conceptual scheme.
Consider, for example, Euclid's proof of proposition 4.
Let ABC, DEF be two triangles having the two sides AB, AC equal to the two sides DE, DF respectively, namely AB to DE and AC to DF, and the angle BAC equal to the angle EDF. I say that the base BC is also equal to the base EF, the triangle ABC will be equal to the triangle DEF … For, if the triangle ABC be applied to the triangle DEF, and if the point A be placed on the point D and the A B C straight line AB on E, then the point B will also coincide with E, because AB is equal to DE. Again, AB coinciding with DE, the straight line AC will also coincide with DF, because the angle BAC is equal to the angle EDF; hence the point C will also coincide with the point F, because AC is again equal to DF. But B also coincided with E; hence the base BC will coincide with the base EF … and will be equal to it. Thus the whole triangle ABC will coincide with the whole triangle DEF, and will be equal to it. On the other hand, A and B each have a property that C lacks. Their magnetic field points towards their sharp end. This is in some sense a relational property, it is defined in part in terms of two things pointing in the same direction, but it doesn't seem like a relation between the magnet and anything else. In general, properties that things have in virtue of relations between their parts are intrinsic properties. (It is intrinsic to the earth, for example, that more of its surface is wet than dry, even though this property is defined in terms of a relation.) So this is an intrinsic property of A. And, given the plausibility of the Intrinsicness Principle, that's a reason to think that A and C are not intrinsic.
The Principles and the Problem
Here then is our problem. Second, we'll assume that the direction of a vector feature is not an intrinsic feature of its bearer. Now we want to show that B and C are duplicates. To do this we'll use the Parts Principle.
All of the fundamental quantities are local, so the Parts Principle applies. Now let the members of X and Y be the point-sized parts of A and C. Let l be the distance from the tip of the pointed end of A to the tip of the pointed end of C. The isometry i is a translation with length l and direction d 1 , i.e. a function that maps any point to the point that is distance l away from it in direction d 1 .
This isometry maps A onto C. By the first clause of the Intrinsicness Principle, and the assumption that direction is not intrinsic, every point in A is a duplicate of any point in C. So by the Parts Principle, A and C are required.
The conclusion is that if we want to say that A and B are duplicates, but A and C are not duplicates, then we can't hold on to both the Intrinsicness Principle and the Parts Principle.
I think we should give up the Parts Principle. In particular, we should say that the Parts
Principle holds only if all the perfectly natural features of reality are local, and this might fail to hold even if all the fundamental features of reality are local. The need for the distinction between these possibilities is, I think, the main lesson of the problem. But before we get to that conclusion, I want to address an objection to the argument so far.
Two Worries About Locality
I can an imagine an objection to this argument along the following lines. In the setup of the problem, I said that some of the fundamental features of reality are vector-valued quantities. I also said that all of the fundamental features of reality are local. But these assumptions are inconsistent. Vector properties are not intrinsic properties of points. (Since we're trying to hold on to the Intrinsicness Principle, we have to accept this.) Hence they are not, in the salient sense, local features of reality.
I think this objection is sound all the way to the last step. As noted above, we need to distinguish between local properties and intrinsic properties of points. The distinction is common in mathematics, but has not been paid sufficient attention in metaphysics. Jeremy Butterfield's (2006) is an important exception, one that was very influential on this paper. Once we've said that, however, a different kind of objection becomes salient. It might be thought that if the fundamental features are intrinsic properties of regions not of points, the natural version of the Parts Principle is slightly weaker than as stated. In particular, we should focus our attention to cases where the sets X and Y consist of objects with positive size. Because this weakening flows naturally from the definition of locality, it doesn't look like an ad hoc weakening. However this weakening does not at the end of the day help to save the Parts Principle. That's because we can find a different way to divide up A and C into parts of positive size so that the Parts Principle still applies. A sketch of how we'll (start to) divide up A is here.
The idea is that we make one large square part, and then divide the rest of A up into infinitely many diamonds. We do this recursively. Note that we start with a triangle whose base is to the left and vertex to the right. We create from this a diamond whose four vertices are the vertex of the triangle, and the midpoints of each of the three sides of the triangle. If we imagine cutting this diamond out of the magnet, we'd be left with two small triangles, each with a base on the left and a vertex on the right. We can do the same trick to create diamonds and (in imagination) cut them out, leaving us with four triangles. Repeat this until we have an infinity of diamonds. The fusion of all these diamonds with the large square will be our original magnet. Moreover, since every part is symmetric around the axis perpendicular to d 1 , each part will be a duplicate of the corresponding part in C. So the Parts Principle still tells us, falsely, that A and C are duplicates.
We have to look somewhere else to avoid the problem.
The solution and its problems
The Asymmetric Magnets Problem looks easy. It is easy to say intuitively why A and B are
duplicates, but C is not. The reason was given at the end of section three. In both A and B, the magnetic field 'points' in the same direction that the physical object does, while in C this is not the case. The difficulty arises when we try and shoehorn this intuition into a formal theory. We need to say that it is intrinsic to the magnet that its magnetic field points the same way it does.
And we need to say this without saying that the direction of the magnetic field is itself intrinsic. I know of one way to do this, but it involves some overheads. I'm not going to argue for this at any length here, but I think the difficulty of providing a general solution to the Asymmetric Magnets Problem is one of many reasons to think that we should learn to live with these overheads.
My solution starts with Lewis's definition of duplication. I gave a rough statement of this above; we now need a more precise statement. For Lewis, two objects are duplicates iff there is a mapping m from parts of one to parts of the other that (a) is an isomorphism and (b) for all n-place perfectly natural properties P, and all parts x 1 , …, x n of the first object, Px 1 …x n iff suggests that we take determinables as being perfectly natural. The individual mass properties are perfectly natural, he suggests, but not fundamental. What is fundamental is the determinable, mass, of which they are determinate.
I think we should make a more radical move in the interests of simplicity. What reason do we have for thinking that the fundamental ways things are are properties rather than quantities or magntitudes? Very little reason, I'd say. Modern physics seems much more concerned with quantities than properties. What properties it is concerned with, such as being positively charged, seem to be derived from more fundamental quantities, such as charge. It would perhaps be convenient for formal semantics if the world had an object-property structure to match the subject-predicate structure of simple sentences. But we have no reason to believe the world will be so accommodating. It might turn out that there are a few fundamental quantities in the world.
A quantity is a feature that objects have to different degrees. We can identify each value a quantity takes with a property. (Examples are properties like having mass 17kg.) But that shouldn't make us think that the properties are metaphysically primary. They might be derived from the quantities. Hawthorne's and Denby's arguments push us towards that conclusion, and quantities that take structured values allows us to capture this indirect relevance. We'll do so by defining a feature whose magnitude varies depending on how the object's shape and the direction of its vector features are coordinated.
Let f be a function representing some perfectly natural quantity such that f(x) is a vector.
That is, f represents some perfectly natural vector quantity. This quantity may or may not be fundamental, though it will be fundamental in the cases under consideration here. Let c be a function that takes an object as input and returns its geometric centre as output. (By the geometric centre of x I mean the centre of mass of an object with the same shape as x and uniform mass density throughout.) Now suppose that the following function is perfectly natural.
g(x, y, z) = df the cosine of the angle between f(x) and the ray from c(y) to c(z)
The motivation for taking this to be perfectly natural (but obviously not fundamental) is that it delivers the right results about the Asymmetric Magnets Problem, and it seems to deliver those results for the right reasons. To see it delivers the right results, just apply the above definition of duplication. Two objects are duplicates iff there is an isomorphism m from the parts of one to the parts of the other and (b) for all n-place natural functions f, and all parts x 1 , …, x n of the first
To make the discussion easier, we'll redraw the magnets with some salient parts labelled.
Any isomorphism from A to B that satisfy this constraint has to map A 1 to B 1 , and A 2 to B 2 . And any isomorphism from A to C that satisfy this constraint has to map A 1 to C 1 , and A 2 to C 2 . Now let f be the function whose value is represented by the arrow, and let g be the function defined as I don't doubt that there are other ways to solve this problem, so I certainly won't try arguing that this is the only solution. But I think it works, and the reason it works is because the values of natural quantities are structured entities, in this case vectors. 
Wrapping Up
This paper has had several ambitions, some loftier than others. The most basic aim has been to introduce the Asymmetric Magnets Problem, and argue that it is going to be hard work for a systematic theory of intrinsicness to account for the facts about the problem. The more profound aims involve tearing apart concepts that metaphysicians often take for granted are interchangeable. My solution to the problem involves distinguishing local features from intrinsic features of points, fundamental features from perfectly natural features, and, most importantly, features from properties. The last of these is I think the biggest point. If we come to believe that quantities, not qualities, are the fundamental ways things are, then quite a bit of metaphysical orthodoxy needs rewriting. Some of that rewriting may be simple; just a matter of crossing out
